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A small stochastic model of a pension fund with endogenous saving1
In this paper we investigate whether uncertainty on the real rate of return on capital and
productivity growth (labelled as economic uncertainty) is more or less important than mortality
and fertility uncertainty (labelled as demographic uncertainty) for a consumer facing a decision
how much to save. Furthermore we look at the errors that are made when uncertainty is
neglected in consumer behaviour. The results indicate that economic uncertainty is far more
important than demographic uncertainty. The welfare costs of neglecting uncertainty in
consumer behaviour seem to be small.
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21 Introduction
We live in an uncertain world, yet a lot of research into the sustainability of welfare states is
done in the context of certainty. There are good reasons why the analysis is mostly conﬁned to a
model of a certain world. A full analysis of the sustainability of welfare states which includes all
relevant economic interactions is already intricate in a certain world because it requires the use
of complex dynamic general equilibrium models. Even without stochastics, understanding all
the mechanisms and its results is sometimes difﬁcult. In addition, when building stochastics into
these type of models one may run into the limitations of computer capacity.
This paper explores, at a very general level, the consequences of a stochastic environment for
sustainability and economic behaviour. We will use of rather simple setting of only two
overlapping generations where consumers only work the ﬁrst period of their lives and are retired
in the second period. Labour supply is exogenous. Hence, consumer behaviour here is restricted
to the choice of private savings in the ﬁrst period. When choosing how much to save, consumers
take into account the contributions they have to pay to a mandatory pension fund and the beneﬁts
they expect to receive from this pension fund. And, of course, they take into account the
economic and demographic uncertainty they face. Even in this simple setting, we have to rely on
(stochastic) simulations to derive results.
This research has been done as part of a large project called DEMWEL where economic
analysis of population ageing is combined with statistical analysis of demographic uncertainty.
One of the parts of the project is to explore on a general level the value added of the tool of
stochastic simulations. Two main questions lay the foundation of this paper. First, which source
of uncertainty is more important for the savings decision of an optimising consumer, economic
uncertainty or demographic uncertainty? Second, what is the impact of both sources of
uncertainty on consumer behaviour? Or put it differently, what is the error economic agents
make when uncertainty is neglected in consumer behaviour.
We distinguish four sources of economic uncertainty. First, there is uncertain productivity
growth. In our model, productivity growth affects consumer behaviour via the pension fund. The
other three sources of economic uncertainty are bond returns, equity returns and inﬂation rates.
Together they determine the real portfolio return of private savings and mandatory pension
savings. For simplicity we impose that there is no endogenous portfolio selection for the pension
fund and consumers.
Demographic uncertainty comes from two sources: aggregate fertility risks and aggregate
mortality risks. Cross-sectional mortality risks are assumed to be fully insurable. Examples of
possible aggregate mortality risks are the discovery of a cure against cancer which implies a
higher life expectancy (which is good news for individuals but bad news for pension funds and
3life insurance companies). An aggregate mortality risk in the other direction is the mutation of
the bird ﬂu into a human variant. In so far the decline in fertility rates in the previous century
was unforeseen, it is an example of an aggregate fertility risk.
We will show that the exact behavioural effects of all these sources of uncertainty depend on
the type of pension scheme. We distinguish four types of pension schemes that can labelled
along two dimensions. The ﬁrst dimension is the distinction between deﬁned beneﬁt (DB) and
deﬁned contribution (DC). The second dimension deals with the way pension beneﬁts are
ﬁnanced; that is, by funding or at a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) basis.
Assessing the the importance of economic uncertainty vis-à-vis demographic uncertainty, the
results indicate that for a consumer facing both types of uncertainty, it is economic uncertainty
that matters the most. As to the second question, the consequences for behaviour of including
uncertainty, the results suggest that the average welfare costs of not taking uncertainty into
account are fairly low.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 gives an introductory discussion
about the potential advantages and limitations of stochastic simulations. Also some related
literature is discussed. Section 3 presents the model used which is a simple two-period
overlapping generations model of a small open economy with consumers and a mandatory
pension fund. Section 4 presents some analytical results regarding consumption and saving. In
section 5 we discuss the characteristics of the random variables and analyse the impact of
deterministic shocks in these variables on consumer behaviour. In section 6 we turn to stochastic
simulations and try to answer the main questions raised above. Finally, section 7 concludes with
a discussion of the results and some suggestions for future research.
42 The advantages and limitations of stochastic simulations
Uncertainties are all around. We can use a number of classiﬁcations. First, uncertainties can be
demographic or non-demographic, like economic or ﬁnancial types of uncertainty. Second,
uncertainties can apply to different future periods. Indeed, uncertainties on ﬁnancial markets are
more short term, whereas demographic uncertainties typically apply to longer terms. A third
distinction is the level at which uncertainties are relevant. Some uncertainties are especially
relevant at the microeconomic level and play less of a role at a macroeconomic level; others are
relevant at both levels. Uncertainties are even not conﬁned to the values of variables. Indeed, the
values of model parameters may be uncertain as well and the same applies even to the type of
model that describes the economy. In applied work, one often faces different types of uncertainty
simultaneously. For example, in making an assessment of the viability of welfare state programs
with an economic model, one uses a speciﬁc model, combined with speciﬁc parameter values
and speciﬁc time paths for demographic and non-demographic variables.
The scope of the research in this paper is much more moderate. It takes as given the model
that is used to describe the economy and also the speciﬁc values of model parameters. It focuses
on aggregate shocks. It models a variety of shocks and basically asks two questions. First, what
is the role of demographic uncertainties relative to non-demographic uncertainties? Second, do
predictions on the impact of demographic and non-demographic shocks change when the
analysis accounts for an impact of uncertainty on consumers saving behaviour?
Traditionally, we adopt scenario analysis or sensitivity analysis to demonstrate the impact of
uncertainties. In sensitivity analysis, we change the time path of one exogenous variable at a
time in order to see the robustness of outcomes with respect to that particular variable. In
scenario analysis, we do something similar, but change two or more exogenous variables
simultaneously. These two types of uncertainty analysis have in common that they tend to use a
small number of variants: an analysis may contain not more than ﬁve or ten sensitivity variants,
whereas scenarios usually come in much smaller numbers.
Stochastic simulation analysis differs from the other two types of uncertainty analysis in the
number of simulations or variants. Indeed, stochastic simulations use hundreds or thousands of
simulations. Therefore, stochastic simulation analysis allows one to depict the full distribution of
the endogenous variables, which may be more informative than one or two points of that
distribution.
Obviously, stochastic simulations take more time. Hence, it is good to ask beforehand what
precisely are the beneﬁts one can expect to reap from the tool of stochastic simulation analysis?
We argue that there are two types of beneﬁts. The ﬁrst relates to a better exploitation of available
information. We propose to call this descriptive beneﬁts. The second refers to the possibility to
5make model adjustments on the basis of the information provided by stochastic simulation
analysis. We propose to call the corresponding beneﬁts analytical beneﬁts. Let us start with the
descriptive beneﬁts. We think of four types of descriptive beneﬁts:
1. The average values of endogenous variables that follow from a stochastic simulation analysis
may differ from the values that correspond with the average simulation, i.e. the simulation that
uses the average values taken by the exogenous variables in the model. The means of a
stochastic simulation exercise and the outcome of the path that corresponds to the means of
exogenous variables will always be different in case there are non-linearities in the model. The
interesting question is whether these non-linearities are such that a simple simulation of the
average path gives a completely false picture.
2. Stochastic simulations give an idea about the whole distribution, i.e. its location, its variance, its
higher moments. They allow for calculating quintiles, quartiles etc. and are therefore more
informative than traditional projection analysis. Note that the distribution of the variables itself
may be relevant to policymakers. There are examples of policy reforms that are driven by the
aim to change the variance rather than the mean of some variables. Think of policies that aim to
reduce the vulnerability of pensions to shocks in life expectancy, like in Finland, or policies that
aim to reduce the impact of inﬂation shocks on the government budget (indexed bonds). In the
pension sphere, one may think of portfolio-allocation policies (asset-liability matching).
Traditional projection analysis does not assess the spread of possible outcomes and cannot be
informative about this aspect of government policies.
3. Stochastic simulation analysis allows an assessment of the plausibility of typical scenarios and
typical projections (Lee and Edwards (2002)). This may be helpful in deﬁning scenarios.
Indeed, given the information that is provided by stochastic simulation analysis, it is possible to
select scenarios on the condition that they are more or less equally plausible. The same applies
to sensitivity analysis. Stochastic simulation analysis makes it possible to make shocks in
different exogenous variables more comparable by quantifying their standard deviations. This is
helpful in choosing the size of shocks in exogenous variables.
4. Stochastic simulation analysis also allows to account for correlations between innovations in
different variables which may be fundamental in assessing the distribution of those endogenous
variables that are driven by many correlated exogenous variables. In a different dimension,
stochastic simulation analysis can account for serial correlations in variables and therefore study
a variety of shocks that range from temporary to permanent. Both types of correlations may be
relevant in projection studies (Lee and Tuljapurkar (2001)).
On the downside, as said, stochastic simulations take more time. If the model at hand is
rather simple, this argument may have little relevance. But if the model used consists of
thousands of equations and a number of simultaneities, then it may become hard to do stochastic
6simulation analysis. One may then economize on the number of runs, but that could imply a
severe loss of quality.
More fundamentally, stochastic simulation analysis fails to indicate the role of fundamental
uncertainties. This relates to the Knightian distinction between risk and uncertainty (Knight
(1921)). If uncertainties are so overwhelmingly large that even the distribution of outcomes
cannot be meaningfully deﬁned, then stochastic simulation analysis is out of place. A difﬁcult
issue is that it is hard to tell a priori which variables should be classiﬁed as uncertain and risky.
Probably, one can say something about that afterwards, but this conclusion obviously does not
help that much.
Sometimes it is possible to make a compromise. Indeed, exogenous variables may behave in
the future differently than in the past, but not in every aspect. For example, the distribution may
exhibit a change of mean, leaving the rest of the distribution intact. In this case, it remains
possible to perform stochastic simulation analysis, be it that one has to add one or more
sensibility or plausibility checks.
What are the analytical beneﬁts of stochastic simulation analysis? These beneﬁts arise when
a case can be made that the distribution of variables affects decision-making. Examples are
consumers who engage in precautionary saving in order to mitigate future income uncertainty.
This mechanism has been known in the literature for several decades (Leland (1968), Sandmo
(1970)). A number of papers investigate the saving effects of income uncertainty on an empirical
basis (Hubbard et al. (1995), Engen and Gruber (2001)). Another way for consumers to absorb
income uncertainty is to adjust portfolios. In particular, by reducing portfolio investments in
risky assets, in particular in those the returns of which correlate positively with labour income,
consumers can make their consumption less volatile (Bodie et al. (1992), Viceira (2001)).
However, it is not only consumers who can anticipate future uncertainty. A case can also be
made for precautionary savings by the government (Auerbach and Hasset (2001), Steigum
(2001)) and for government portfolio strategies (Lucas and Stokey (1983), Bohn (1990)). A third
example is funded pension schemes, which will be explored in this paper. It is difﬁcult to see
how one can account for these types of behaviour without stochastic simulation analysis.
73 The model
We use a Diamond model of a small open economy. The model contains consumers and a
pension fund. There is uncertainty on four economic variables: the return on nominal bonds
(rb
t ), equity returns (re
t ), productivity growth (gt) (which equals wage growth) and, ﬁnally,
inﬂation (it). There is also uncertainty on two demographic variables: the fertility rate (nt) and
the survival rate (εt). We assume that economic uncertainty and demographic uncertainty are
uncorrelated.
The sequence of events is as follows. Shocks occur at the beginning of a period. After these
shocks have occurred, consumers and funds decide on savings and contribution rates
respectively. Consequently, when people make their choices, they know the interest rate, the
equity return, the productivity growth (and, hence, their wages) and the population size of that
period. However, when deciding on the level of private saving, the consumers face uncertainty
with respect to the return on their private savings in the next period and the pension fund beneﬁt
they will receive. Furthermore, they are uncertain about their life expectancy.
3.1 Consumers
The model is populated by a large number of identical consumers who live for two periods. So
in each period both a young and old generation are alive. The young generation works and the
old generation is retired. The size of a generation born at (the beginning of) period t is denoted
by L1t and it grows at rate nt, thus L1t = (1+nt)L1t−1. A decrease in nt can be interpreted as a
decrease in the fertility rate. Furthermore, we assume that a consumer born at t lives throughout
old age with probability εt+1. Therefore, at time t there are L2t = εtL1t−1 old consumers. We can
interpret εt as an average life expectancy: when εt rises, people expect to live longer. Note that
both the growth rate nt as the longevity rate εt are random variables.
As mentioned, consumers work in the ﬁrst period and are retired in the second period. In the
ﬁrst period they earn labour income (yt). Labour supply is exogenous. The consumers
participate in a mandatory pension fund. The ﬁrst period they pay a contribution rate (πt), the
second period they receive a beneﬁt (bt+1). In the second period agents consume the pension
beneﬁt received from the pension fund and the proceeds from their private savings (st). Thus,
ﬁrst period consumption (c1t) and second period consumption (c2t+1) equal:





with rt+1 the random real return to be deﬁned later. We assume that private savings are invested
8in a perfect annuity market so that savings of the deceased will be distributed among the
survivors. The return on savings for those who survive is therefore (1+rt+1)/εt+1. Note that the
ex ante expected return on savings is equal to (1+Etrt+1), where Et denotes the expectations
operator of time t. Also note that εt+1 is a random variable which implies that there is aggregate
mortality risk. Contrary to cross-sectional mortality risk, aggregate mortality risk cannot be
insured away. Hence, consumers bear the aggregate mortality risk themselves.













The budget constraint has to hold for each state of nature.
Consumers maximize expected utility with a CRRA instantaneous utility function. That is, at





























subject to equation (3.3). In equation (3.5) ρ is the subjective discount rate and θ is the
coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion. The second line follows by noticing that uncertainty only
appears in the second period.
3.2 Capital market
It is assumed that the portfolio of consumers and pension funds are identical and ﬁxed to contain
a share β equity and a share 1−β (nominal) bonds. Thus, there is no endogenous portfolio













Our pension fund aims at a wage-indexed pension with a replacement rate α of the previous
wage income, i.e. the target beneﬁt level is bt+1 = (1+gt+1)αyt.1 Since gt+1 is random, the
target beneﬁt level is random as well. Hence, the expected target beneﬁt equals
Etbt+1 = (1+Etgt+1)αyt.
The budget constraint of the pension fund reads:
At = (1+rt)At−1+πtYt −Bt (3.8)
where At are the accumulated assets of the pension fund at the end of period t. Throughout we
use a capital letter as the aggregate in cohort terms, hence in equation (3.8)Yt = ytL1t denotes
total income earned by workers in period t and Bt = btL2t denotes total pension beneﬁts received
by the retirees.
Pensions can either be funded or be ﬁnanced on a PAYG basis. In case pensions are funded,
the contribution rate πt, charged by the pension fund, is invested to cover the beneﬁt paid out the
next period. The deﬁcit (Dt) of a pension fund is the difference between the assets accumulated
by a generation and the actual beneﬁts paid to this generation. That is,
Dt+1 = (1+rt+1)At −Bt+1 (3.9)
When determining the contribution rates for the funded schemes, we require the (expected)
deﬁcit to be zero.2 In case PAYG ﬁnancing is used there is no capital accumulation and
equation (3.8) simpliﬁes to:
πtYt = Bt (3.10)
We distinguish four types of pension schemes that can labelled along two dimensions. One
dimension is the distinction between Deﬁned Contribution (DC) schemes where the contribution
rate is ﬁxed and the beneﬁt depends on the uncertain return on the invested contribution, and
Deﬁned Beneﬁt (DB) schemes where the beneﬁt is ﬁxed and the contribution rate is uncertain
because it depends on possible shortfalls or surpluses of the funding of the beneﬁts. The other
dimension is the distinction between methods of ﬁnancing the pension beneﬁts: PAYG versus
funding.
1 Remember that we assumed wage growth to be equal to productivity growth.
2 Alternatively, one could also look at the funding ratio (Ft) of the pension fund, deﬁned as Ft = At/(Bt+1/(1+rt+1)). In a
deterministic world, requiring the deﬁcit to be zero is equal to requiring the funding ratio to be one. In a stochastic world,
requiring a zero expected deﬁcit implies At ·Et[1+rt+1]/Et[Bt+1] = 1; eequiring the expected funding ratio to be one
implies At ·Et[(1+rt+1)/Bt+1] = 1. In general Et[1+rt+1]/Et[Bt+1] 6= Et[(1+rt+1)/Bt+1]. Hence, a zero expected
deﬁcit does not imply a funding ratio of one.
10Actuarial fairness, actuarial neutrality and net beneﬁts
Lindbeck and Persson (2003) have used three dimensions to classify pension schemes. In addition to the two dimensions
applied in this paper, they also deployed actuarial versus non-actuarial as a third dimension. They deﬁne actuarial fairness
as a scheme where the marginal return on a consumers contribution is equal to the market rate of interest. This differs
from Börsch-Supan (1992) who deﬁnes actuarial fairness as zero net beneﬁts, i.e. beneﬁts minus contributions, for all
(retirement) ages. Furthermore, Börsch-Supan (1992) makes a distinction with actuarial neutrality which is deﬁned as
unchanged net beneﬁts in case retirement is postponed or advanced.
Actuarial fairness as deﬁned by Börsch-Supan (1992) is also of interest for new entrants into a pension fund because it
tells them whether participation in this pension scheme is a good deal. Therefore, we will look at this net beneﬁt for each







The sign of this net beneﬁt indicates whether it is a good or bad deal to participate in a particular pension scheme.
3.3.1 Funded DC pensions
In case of a funded DC scheme, the pension fund ﬁxes the contribution rate at a level such that,
ex ante, the expected target beneﬁt level can be paid. This is equivalent to a zero expected
















Note that the realized return on the invested contribution is higher than (1+rt+1) because, as
with private savings, the assets of those who do not make it into the second period are equally
divided between the survivors. From combining equation (3.12) and (3.13) it follows
immediately that the beneﬁt is not necessarily equal to the target beneﬁt level. The realizations
of rt+1, gt+1 and εt+1 can differ from their expected values. Furthermore, the net beneﬁt of a
funded DC scheme is always zero.
3.3.2 Funded DB pensions




t+1 = (1+gt+1)αyt (3.14)
3 Throughout this paper superscripts F and P denote respectively a Funded scheme and a Pay-As-You-Go scheme, while
superscripts DC and DB denote respectively a Deﬁned Contribution scheme and Deﬁned Beneﬁt scheme.

















Equation (3.15) can be split in two parts. The ﬁrst part, π1
t , is the actuarial cost price of the
retirement beneﬁt. This contribution rate is set so that, in expectation, there is no surplus or
shortfall in the fund, i.e. Et[Dt+1] = 0. Note that this part of the contribution rate equals the DC
contribution rate in equation (3.12). The second part, π2
t , is a possible surcharge on the actuarial
contribution rate that compensates any losses or gains in the funding of the beneﬁts of the
previous generation. In latter case the surcharge is negative, hence the total contribution rate is











Note that even if the fund starts with zero deﬁcit (thus with a zero surcharge π2
t ), the net beneﬁt
is not equal to zero since Et [εt+1(1+gt+1)/(1+rt+1)] 6= (1+Etgt+1)·Etεt+1/(1+Etrt+1).4
3.3.3 PAYG DC pensions
Instead of funding the DC and DB schemes can also be ﬁnanced on a PAYG basis. When we
have a DC scheme, the contribution rate is ﬁxed and based on the expected implicit return in a
















A PAYG ﬁnanced DC pension scheme is also known as a notional deﬁned contribution (NDC)







In general, whether the net beneﬁt is positive or negative depends on whether
(1+nt+1)(1+gt+1) is larger or smaller than (1+rt+1).5
4 See also footnote 2.
5 This condition has already been derived in Aaron (1966).
123.3.4 PAYG DB pensions
Again, as in the funded DB scheme, the beneﬁt is ﬁxed:
b
P,DB
t+1 = (1+gt+1)αyt (3.20)


















Table 3.1 summarizes the preceding sections. From this table, one can easily see where the
uncertainty comes in. In case of DC schemes, the contribution rates are ﬁxed and based on the
expected values of the random variables. The uncertainty shows up in the pension beneﬁts. With
DB schemes, the pension beneﬁts are only uncertain with respect to the indexation to
productivity growth, all the other uncertainty is borne by the working generation.
Table 3.1 Summary of pension schemes
Funded PAYG
DC πt = Etεt+1





εt+1 πtyt bt+1 =
(1+nt+1)(1+gt+1)
εt+1 πtyt
At = πtYt At = 0
Et[NB] = 0 Et[NB] Q 0








bt+1 = (1+gt+1)αyt bt+1 = (1+gt+1)αyt
At = πtYt At = 0
Et[NB] Q 0 Et[NB] Q 0
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This is a standard result which can be found in e.g. Romer (2001). It states that the marginal
contribution of consumption to (expected) lifetime utility in the ﬁrst period of life must be equal
to the marginal contribution in the second period of life. Solving the budget constraint (3.3) for



















In general this equation cannot be solved analytically for c1t and we have to use stochastic
simulation techniques to derive further results in this more general setup. However, before
turning to the simulation results, we look at some special and standard cases where we are able
to derive analytical solutions.
4.1 ...when there is no uncertainty











































Intuitively, a rise in rt has both an income and a substitution effect. For θ < 1 (θ > 1) the
substitution (income) effect dominates and equation (4.6) is increasing (decreasing) in rt. In the
14special case of θ = 1 (logarithmic utility), the two effects balance, and equation (4.6) is
independent of rt. Recall that yLF
t = yt(1−πt)+εt+1bt+1/(1+rt+1) denotes lifetime income.








Private savings are lowered by an amount equal to the present value of the future pension beneﬁt.










Several remarks can be made. First, in a certain world, the difference between DB and DC
becomes irrelevant. Because DB and DC aim for the same pension beneﬁt ex ante, the absence
of uncertainty implies that, ex post, the beneﬁts will be equal as well. Furthermore, when the
pensions are funded, pension savings are replacing private savings one-to-one since both forms
of savings are invested with the same portfolio composition. Hence, ﬁrst period consumption
and second period consumption are identical to the values that would have resulted if there
would not have been a pension fund. This can easily be seen in equation (4.3) from noticing that
in the case of funded pensions πtyt = εt+1bt+1/(1+rt+1) for any value of π and b. By looking at
equations (4.7) and (4.8) it can immediately be seen that private savings are reduced by an
amount equal to the contribution to the pension fund, whereas total savings are unaffected.
In case the mandatory pension beneﬁts are PAYG ﬁnanced, the replacement need not to be
one-to-one since the implicit rate of return on the PAYG pension contributions need not to be
equal to the explicit rate of return on private savings. That means, when the implicit rate of
return on a PAYG contribution is lower than the rate of return on the private savings, consumers
are forced to ‘save’ part of their resources in a low yielding ‘asset’ which implies a lower
lifetime income. This lower lifetime income is then divided over ﬁrst period and second period
consumption such that marginal utility of consumption in both periods is equal. Hence, in this
case, under a PAYG scheme, consumption will be lower in both periods.
This difference between funding and PAYG ﬁnancing also shows up in the net beneﬁts. In





















15where dt is the dependency ratio which is the number of retirees over the number of active
people i.e. dt = εt/(1+nt). In both equations the Aaron-rule shows up. Under a PAYG DC
scheme the net beneﬁt is negative if the implicit return of the PAYG scheme is lower than the
explicit market return, . Under a PAYG DB scheme the same holds if ε and n are constant over
time and, thus, the dependency ratio is constant over time. Otherwise, it depends on the
development of the dependency ratio.
4.2 ...when there is uncertainty but no pension fund
In case there is uncertainty but no pension fund, consumers only face uncertainty with respect to
the returns on their private savings and their life expectancy. Since there are no PAYG ﬁnanced
transfers, consumers are not affected by uncertainty with respect to generation growth nt.
Furthermore, wages are determined before they choose their level of savings. Thus, uncertainty
on productivity growth has also no effect.




























Note that, because there is no pension fund, yLF
t = yt. It can easily be shown that if θ > 1
savings are higher than in the case with no uncertainty (and no pension fund or funded pensions
which is irrelevant as shown before), i.e. Ets(rt+1,εt+1) > s(rt+1,εt+1). These extra savings are
precautionary savings. Uncertainty on the rate of return and on aggregate mortality both imply
capital market uncertainty. For the latter case, recall that the return on saving equals
(1+rt+1)/εt+1. Thus, more uncertainty on aggregate mortality implies more uncertainty on the
return on private savings. As shown in Sandmo (1970), capital market uncertainty induces a
substitution effect and an income effect. In case θ > 1, the income effect dominates and the
uncertainty leads to an increase in (private) savings.








where Ets(rt+1,εt+1) is given in equation (4.12). Because of the extra savings, ﬁrst period
16consumption is lower than in the case with no uncertainty, second period consumption is ex ante
expected to be higher but, of course, ex post it can be either higher or lower.
4.3 ...when there is uncertainty and a pension fund
When there is uncertainty and a pension fund, we can only derive analytical solutions in case of
funded DC pensions. For solutions of the other cases we have to use stochastic simulation
techniques.
In a DC scheme the contribution rate is ﬁxed. Hence, we can insert equation (3.12) into the
ﬁrst-order condition (4.2). Because in a DC scheme ex ante as well as ex post it holds that












In this case private savings equal:
s
F,DC







Given that the portfolio of the pension fund is equal to the portfolio of the consumer, there is no
essential difference between private saving and saving through the pension fund except for the
fact that pension saving is compulsory and private saving voluntary. Hence, the consumer lowers
his private savings exactly by the amount he is forced to save through the pension fund.
Logically it follows that ﬁrst period and second period consumption equals consumption in the
case without a pension fund, i.e. equation (4.13) and (4.14).
For the other three pension schemes, analytical solutions cannot be derived. Following the
analysis in Sandmo (1970) we can conclude that in each case precautionary savings show up if
θ > 1. In all cases, the uncertainty on the rate of return and on aggregate mortality risk has a
positive effect on private savings because the income effect dominates the substitution effect. In
all schemes consumers are exposed to uncertain productivity growth. Uncertain productivity
growth has no effect on the return on savings but, through indexation in DB pension schemes, it
does have an effect on future income. Sandmo (1970) labels this as ’income risk’ and shows that
an increase in income risk always leads to higher private savings. Uncertain fertility only plays a
role in case of a PAYG DC scheme where it induces an income effect only and, thus, increase
private savings.
174.4 Concluding remarks
In this section, we looked at some analytical results from the model developed in the previous
section. However, analytical solutions could only be derived in very special, but less interesting
cases. To get answers to the questions raised in this paper, we have to use stochastic simulations.
Nevertheless, the results derived in this section are worth noticing because they are useful in the
stochastic simulations analysis.
If we look at the model in a world without uncertainty, we noticed that the difference
between DB and DC becomes irrelevant. However, the difference between PAYG and funding
does matter. In the latter case, pension savings are replacing private savings one-to-one. But the
lower implicit rate of return on the PAYG contributions implies a lower lifetime income and,
hence, lower consumption in both periods. This result is also seen in the net beneﬁts. In case of
the funded schemes these are zero. However for the PAYG schemes these are negative (with an
exception for one generation: the retirees when the PAYG scheme is introduced).
If we bring uncertainty into the model but leave the pension funds aside, precautionary
savings shows up in case the coefﬁcient of risk aversion (θ) is high enough. Consumers face
uncertainty on the real rate of return on their private savings and on aggregate mortality risk. As
already shown in Sandmo (1970) this leads to precautionary savings if θ > 1.
Introducing pension funds into the model leads only to analytical solutions in case the
pension fund offers a funded DC scheme. Then, however, pensions savings are a perfect
substitute for private savings. For the other three types of pension schemes one can deduce that
precautionary savings will show up if consumers are sufﬁciently risk averse.
185 Data and shock analysis
In this section we provide a description of the data. The calibration of the parameters as well as
the random variables are treated. Second, we analyse the impact of economic shocks and
demographic shocks under the four pension schemes introduced in the preceding sections.
5.1 Calibration and data
5.1.1 Calibration of model parameters
Our model contains four parameters which have to be calibrated, the rate of time preference (ρ),
the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion (θ), the ambition level of pension beneﬁts (α) and, ﬁnally,
the share of stocks in the asset holdings of a pension fund (β).
The value of the rate of time preference ρ is set at 25% per thirty years, which corresponds to
an annual rate of around 0.75%. We impose θ = 4 as our benchmark value. Further, the
ambition level of pensions is 50% of ﬁrst period income, so α = 0.5. Finally, we assume that the
pension fund and consumers invest an equal share in bonds and stocks, i.e. β = 0.5.
5.1.2 Characteristics of the random variables
Our model contains six exogenous variables which are all random. The economic random
variables are: inﬂation (it), productivity growth (g), return on bonds (rb) and return on stocks
(re). The inﬂation rate does not directly enter into the model, because all variables are expressed
in real terms. The two demographic random variables are the fertility rate (n) and longevity rate
(ε). Throughout the analysis we impose that the economic and demographic random variables
are mutually independent, while the economic random variables themselves are mutually
dependent.
The random draws of the economic variables are obtained from ORTEC.6 They ﬁrst estimate
a VAR model for the economic variables based on annual data of the Dutch economy over the
period 1971-2002. The covariance matrix of the residuals is then used to simulate random
scenarios that all contain one value for each of the economic variables. An annual scenario x is






We received 500 scenarios from Ortec. All these scenarios have been used in our simulation
6 ORTEC is an independent international consultancy ﬁrm that, among other activities, conducts Asset Liability
Management (ALM) studies to address potential risk factors for pension funds.
19analysis. As a consequence, we do not have to make arbitrary assumptions regarding the
distribution of the economic random variables. The correlations of the economic variables that
can be derived from the 500 scenarios are shown in table 5.1.
Table 5.1 Correlation matrixa
inﬂation 1.00 0.95 − 0.27 0.73
productivity growth 0.95 1.00 − 0.13 0.74
return on equity (nominal) − 0.27 − 0.13 1.00 − 0.07
return on bonds (nominal) 0.73 0.74 − 0.07 1.00
a Source: ORTEC
We also need random draws for the fertility rate (n) and the longevity rate (ε). These
variables are computed using a computer program PEP (Program for Error Propagation). This
program, written at the Department of Statistics, University of Joensuu, generates long-term
stochastic population forecasts for many European countries, including the Netherlands.7
Several remarks can be made at this point. First, recall that nt = L1t/L1t−1 and
εt = L2t/L1t−1, with L1 the working generation and L2 the retired generation. We assume that the
working generation consists of people whose age ranges from 31 to 60 while the retired
generation consists of people with an age between 61 and 90 years old.8 Second, nt and εt reﬂect
thirty-years ﬁgures.
The random draws of the fertility rate are directly taken from PEP. However, the computation
of the longevity draws involves a two-step procedure. In the ﬁrst step we derive the mean and
variance of the longevity rate from the ﬁrst and second moments of the fertility rate and the
dependency ratio. It makes sense to use the uncertainty in the dependency ratio, because this
variable captures both key demographic trends in the Netherlands, low fertility and increasing
life expectancy. Recall that the dependency ratio is deﬁned as d = ε/(1+n). Hence, once we
















where µx and σ2
x denote, respectively, the mean and variance of x. In the second step, we
postulate that the longevity rate is normally distributed. That is, we draw 500 times from the
normal distribution with mean µε and variance σ2
ε .
7 See Alho and Spencer (1997) for a description of the PEP program.
8 We have checked for other deﬁnitions of L1 and L2 as well. We found that the most important conclusions from the
model simulations (see section 6) are not sensitive for this deﬁnition.
20Table 5.2 presents the mean, median and standard deviation of the random variables. Since
the economic variables are cumulated annual ﬁgures, we also report the corresponding one-year
numbers in parentheses. In absolute terms the standard deviation of the demographic variables is
rather low compared to that of the economic variables. However, relative to its corresponding
mean value, the standard deviation of the fertility rate is the highest one, while the standard
deviation of the longevity rate is the smallest. The standard deviation of the return on equity is
high, also in relative terms.
Table 5.2 Characteristics random variables, cumulated thirty-years ﬁguresa
productivity growth return on equity return on bonds inﬂation fertility rate longevity rate
mean 0.73 15.37 7.16 2.24 − 0.05 0.73
(0.018) (0.098) (0.072) (0.040) - -
median 0.73 12.19 6.99 2.09 − 0.04 0.73
standard deviation 0.28 10.89 1.64 0.96 0.05 0.08
a Numbers in parentheses reﬂect the corresponding one-year means.
5.2 Shock analysis
In this section we investigate the role of the economic and demographic random variables in
more detail. For all four pension schemes distinguished in this paper, we will analyse the welfare
effects of both a positive and a negative one standard deviation shock in one of the random
variables. We are interested how the sensitivity of individual welfare for economic and
demographic shocks differs between the pension schemes. This sensitivity gives us a ﬁrst insight
which risk factors may be important. To simplify the analysis at this point, we leave out any
form of uncertainty. We assume, however, that shocks are temporary and unexpected. It is
further imposed that consumers know that if a shock takes place, it will last just one period. As a
consequence, consumers and the pension fund will not change their expectations after a shock.
5.2.1 Welfare measure
The notion of compensating variation provides a natural way to address the welfare implications
of shocks or policy measures in a deterministic context. Compensating variation is the
compensating payment that leaves the consumer as well off as before the economic change. The
payment is positive for a welfare loss and negative for a welfare gain. For technical details, we
refer to appendix A in which we derive explicit expressions for the compensating variations of
the working generation and the retired generation.
Social welfare (SW) can be deﬁned as the sum of the compensating variations of the
21currently working and retired consumers plus the discounted value of the compensating
variations of future generations. That is,







where CV1 and CV2 denote, respectively, the consumer compensating variation of a working
consumer and a retired consumer. Again, equation (5.3) is positive for a welfare loss and
negative for a welfare gain. Social welfare must be interpreted as society’s maximum willingness
to pay for a utility increasing shock and its minimum acceptable compensation for a utility loss.
With regard to a fertility and longevity shock, equation (5.3) can in principle be computed
with the baseline population or with the new (after-shock) population. Due to the deﬁnition of a
compensation variation, we have chosen for the baseline population.9 Obviously, one can only
compensate consumers in response to a shock if they were already alive in the starting situation.
5.2.2 Base projection
Table 5.3 shows some important ratios for the baseline calibration of the model. In all pension
schemes agents consume 82% of their lifetime income in the ﬁrst period and 18% in the second
period. There is a remarkable difference between the contribution rate in a funded scheme (14%)
and in a PAYG scheme (38%). This is due to the fact that in the model a funded scheme is more
efﬁcient than a PAYG scheme, i.e., (1+n)(1+g) < (1+r).10 Given this relatively high
contribution rate, consumption smoothing induces consumers in the PAYG schemes to borrow in
their ﬁrst period of life. This debt must be repaid during the second period. Because of this
reason second period consumption is lower than the level of pension beneﬁts and hence, pension
beneﬁts as percentage of second period consumption exceeds the hundred percent.
Table 5.3 Baseline scenario
DB funded DC funded DB PAYG DC PAYG
consumption young (% yLF) 81.55 81.55 81.55 81.55
consumption old (% yLF) 18.45 18.45 18.45 18.45
contribution rate (% y ) 14.26 14.26 38.21 38.21
pension beneﬁts (% c2 ) 77.32 77.32 101.66 101.66
private savings (% y ) 4.18 4.18 − 0.23 − 0.23
Note: yLF is lifetime income, y is individual income and c2 is old-age consumption.
9 As a sensitivity analysis we have also calculated equation (5.3) using the after-shock population. We found that the
results are not senstive to the choice of population.
10 Assuming certainty one can check that if (1+n)(1+g) = (1+r) the cost-effective contribution rates in all pension
schemes are equal. However if (1+n)(1+g) > (<) (1+r) the contribution rate in PAYG schemes is lower (higher) than
in funded schemes.
225.2.3 Productivity shock
Let us ﬁrst consider the welfare implications of a positive and negative shock in productivity
growth (g). The shock is unexpected and hence, does not change the cost-effective contribution
rate in funded schemes, see table 3.1. Recall from the same table that the contribution rate in
PAYG schemes does not depend on productivity growth at all. In addition, since consumers do
not alter their expectations, it follows from equation (4.6) that they will not change behaviour.
The upper panel of table 5.4 presents the welfare effects, both for a positive (+) and a negative (-)
productivity shock. Recall that a positive number implies a welfare loss, a negative number a
welfare gain. As a general remark, observe that the welfare effects of a negative shock are larger
than the effects of a positive shock. This is direct consequence of the risk aversion of consumers.
If we focus on the differences between the pension schemes we see, ﬁrst, that for working
consumers the welfare effects are the highest in the funded DC scheme and the lowest in the
funded DB scheme. The effects in the PAYG scheme fall somewhere in between. Higher (lower)
productivity growth increases (decreases) the income of the working consumers and hence,
raises (declines) welfare in all pension schemes. In the funded DB scheme however these
welfare effects are reduced by the catching up premium rate. Recall that in this scheme the
pension beneﬁts are wage-indexed. Therefore, if productivity growth is higher than expected, the
pension savings of the retired generation are not sufﬁcient to pay for the higher indexation. As a
consequence, the working generation has to pay for the higher pension beneﬁts of the old which
lowers welfare. For a negative shock it is just the other way around. Second, with respect to
retirees, we observe that in the funded DC scheme welfare is not sensitive to productivity
shocks. For the other schemes, in which pension beneﬁts are all wage-indexed, the welfare
effects are equal.
To conclude, the differences in welfare indicate that for working consumers productivity risk
is most relevant in the funded DC scheme, followed by the PAYG schemes and the funded DB
scheme. For the retired generation productivity risk does not play a role in the funded DC
scheme as opposed to the other schemes in which productivity growth determines the indexation
of pension beneﬁts.
5.2.4 Portfolio return shock
A shock in the portfolio rate of return (r) leads to different welfare effects. As for the
productivity shock, an unexpected one-shot portfolio return shock does not inﬂuence consumer
behaviour and the cost-effective contribution rates (see table 3.1). Therefore, the welfare of
working consumers is not sensitive to this shock in the funded DC scheme and in the PAYG
schemes. However, from equation (3.15) it follows that this shock affects the catching-up
premium in case of a funded DB scheme. That is, if r increases (decreases) the pension savings
23Table 5.4 Welfare effects economic shocks
DB funded DC funded DB PAYG DC PAYG
Productivity shock + - + - + - + -
compensating variation young (% y) − 1.95 2.70 − 3.15 4.36 − 2.40 3.32 − 2.40 3.32
compensating variation old (% b) − 2.30 3.18 0.00 0.00 − 2.30 3.18 − 2.30 3.18
social welfare (%Y) − 4.70 6.51 − 5.03 6.96 − 4.70 6.51 − 4.70 6.51
Portfolio return shock + - + - + - + -
compensating variation young (% y) − 3.28 12.59 − 0.00 0.00 − 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
compensating variation old (% b) − 1.84 7.05 − 5.03 76.46 0.10 − 0.39 0.10 − 0.39
social welfare (%Y) − 3.99 15.29 − 3.10 11.88 0.04 − 0.15 0.04 − 0.15
Note: y is individual income, b is pension beneﬁt and Y is aggregated income.
of the currently retired generation are too much (few) to cover the guaranteed pension beneﬁts.
Consequently, the catching-up premium is negative (positive) and hence welfare increases
(decreases). Note again that the welfare effects of a negative shock are much larger than those of
a positive shock.
For the retired generation we observe a large difference between the funded schemes and the
PAYG schemes. Not only are the welfare effects for funded schemes much larger, also the
direction of the effects differs. The welfare effects are the highest in the funded DC scheme,
followed by the funded DB scheme. In the ﬁrst one both income sources (pension beneﬁt and
private savings) depend on the portfolio return, while in the second one only private savings are
sensitive to this rate of return. Due to the higher contribution rate, in PAYG schemes private
savings are very small and even negative (see table 5.3). Consequently, retirees suffer (beneﬁt)
from a higher (lower) interest rate, because it increases (decreases) the interest payments on their
debt.
We conclude that for working consumers the risk associated with an unexpected portfolio
return shock is important in the funded DB scheme. In other schemes this risk does not play a
role since the shock does not affect welfare. For retired consumers portfolio return risk is most
relevant in the funded DC scheme, followed by the funded DB scheme. Since the amount of
private savings is very small in PAYG schemes, consumers are hardly confronted with portfolio
return risk.
5.2.5 Fertility shock
From the upper panel of table 5.5 we see that a shock in the fertility rate (n) has no welfare
effects in funded schemes. In these schemes the actuarial contribution rate does not depend on
the fertility rate, see equation (3.15). We therefore concentrate the analysis to the PAYG
schemes.
24A fertility shock affects the contribution rate in a PAYG DB scheme (see table 3.1). An
increase (decrease) in the fertility rate implies that there are more (less) working people to pay
for the pension beneﬁts of the currently retired generation. This lowers (rises) the contribution
rate in a DB scheme and improves (deteriorates) welfare of the young. The pension beneﬁt of
the old does not change and hence, there is no effect on welfare of the old. For the DC scheme
the picture is reversed. The contribution rate does not change after a positive (negative) fertility
shock, but the pension beneﬁts will increase (decrease).
To summarize, in funded schemes a fertility shock has no individual welfare consequences.
This indicates that fertility risk will not be important in these schemes. For PAYG schemes
fertility risk matters because a fertility shock affects welfare of working consumers in a DB
scheme and that of retired consumers in a DC scheme.
Table 5.5 Welfare effects demographic shocks
DB funded DC funded DB PAYG DC PAYG
Fertility shock + - + - + - + -
compensating variation young (% y) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 − 0.39 0.53 0.00 0.00
compensating variation old (% b) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 − 0.74 1.01
social welfare (% Y) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 − 0.37 0.56 − 0.28 0.39
Longevity shock + - + - + - + -
compensating variation young (% y) 0.95 − 0.94 0.00 0.00 0.95 − 0.94 0.00 0.00
compensating variation old (% b) 0.53 − 0.53 2.60 − 2.08 − 0.03 0.03 1.98 − 1.58
social welfare (% Y) 1.15 − 1.15 0.90 − 0.89 0.94 − 0.93 0.68 − 0.68
Note: y is individual income, b is pension beneﬁt and Y is aggregated income.
5.2.6 Longevity shock
The last shock we consider, is a one standard deviation increase and decrease in the longevity
rate (ε). See the lower panel of table 5.5 for the results. A longevity shock does not affect the
cost-effective contribution rate except for the PAYG DB scheme. If longevity increases, in this
scheme consumers has to pay a higher contribution rate. This lowers welfare of the young. For a
negative shock it is just the other way around. In a funded DB scheme the longevity shock
generates a mismatch between the pension beneﬁts and the amount of funding. Consequently,
the catching-up premium increases (decreases) if the longevity rate goes up (down). This leads
to the same welfare implications as in the PAYG DB scheme.
Longevity inﬂuences welfare of retired consumers in all pension schemes. As for the
portfolio return shock, the funded DC scheme is most sensitive to longevity, followed by the
PAYG DC scheme. To understand this result, note that longevity determines the ex-post return
25on private savings, i.e. (1+r)/ε. Since in the funded DC scheme pension savings and private
savings both face this return, the welfare effects are relatively large. In addition, in DC schemes
the pension beneﬁt itself depends negatively on the longevity rate which reinforces the welfare
effects in the funded DC scheme. Note the direction of the welfare effects in the PAYG DB
scheme differs from that in the other schemes. In this scheme we observe a welfare gain (loss) if
longevity increases (decreases). In the PAYG DB scheme consumers borrow in the ﬁrst period
and pay back the debt in the second period. An increase in longevity lowers the effective interest
rate on their debt and, hence boosts welfare.
The welfare effects suggest that working consumers only face longevity risk in the two DB
schemes. While in all pension schemes retired consumers are subject to longeviy risk, the extent
of the risk exposure is most pronounced in the funded DC scheme, followed by the PAYG DC
scheme.
266 Simulation results
The main objectives of this paper are, ﬁrst, the analysis of the impact of uncertainty on
behaviour and, second, the assessment what source of uncertainty, economic or demographic, is
more important. In this section we turn to these questions. For each of the four pension schemes
we simulate and compare the cases of full certainty, full uncertainty, economic uncertainty only
and demographic uncertainty only. To assess the importance of economic and demographic
uncertainty we calculate the certainty equivalents which can be interpreted as the insurance
premium people are willing to pay to avoid (part of) the uncertainty. The impact of uncertainty
on behaviour is analysed by comparing behaviour based on rational expectations with behaviour
based only on the expected values of the random variables (point forecasting).
6.1 Full uncertainty
Looking at the effects of uncertainty on behaviour implies, in this model, looking at the effects
on savings. Because θ, the parameter of risk aversion, is larger than 1, one expects precautionary
savings. Figure 6.1 shows the extra, precautionary private savings under uncertainty as a
percentage of labour income for each of the four pension schemes. These extra private savings
are largest in a funded DC scheme and lowest in a funded DB scheme.
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27Table 6.1 Certainty and uncertainty: Utility, Consumption, Savings
EtyLF
t c1t Etc2t+1 st st +πtyt EtU
(% EtyLF) (% EtyLF) (% y) (% y)
Certainty
DB, Funded 17.30 81.55 18.45 4.18 18.45 52.778
DC, Funded 17.30 81.55 18.45 4.18 18.45 52.778
DB, PAYG 13.16 81.55 18.45 − 0.23 37.97 52.759
DC, PAYG 13.16 81.55 18.45 − 0.23 37.97 52.759
Full Uncertainty
DB, Funded 18.25 77.20 22.80 4.28 18.54 52.777
DC, Funded 17.30 74.86 25.14 10.88 25.14 52.772
DB, PAYG 14.11 74.96 25.05 0.66 38.86 52.758
DC, PAYG 14.10 74.84 25.16 0.81 39.01 52.758
Economic uncertainty
DB, Funded 18.24 77.23 22.77 4.31 18.58 52.777
DC, Funded 17.30 75.27 24.73 10.47 24.73 52.772
DB, PAYG 13.16 75.02 24.98 0.67 38.87 52.758
DC, PAYG 14.10 75.02 24.98 0.67 38.87 52.758
Demographic uncertainty
DB, Funded 17.30 81.57 18.43 4.16 18.43 52.778
DC, Funded 17.30 81.29 18.71 4.44 18.71 52.778
DB, PAYG 13.16 81.55 18.45 − 0.23 37.98 52.759
DC, PAYG 13.16 81.20 18.80 0.03 38.24 52.759
The top half of table 6.1 shows the optimal levels of ﬁrst period and second period
consumption (as percentage of expected lifetime income), private savings and private savings
plus pension contributions (as percentage of labour income) as well as expected lifetime income
and expected utility under both full certainty and full uncertainty.
What can we conclude from this table? First, whether there is certainty or uncertainty,
funded schemes give a higher utility than PAYG schemes if, as is the case here, either scheme is
already operative.11 This is no surprise as under a PAYG scheme people are forced to ‘save’ for
retirement through a pension fund with a lower (implicit) rate of return than under a funded
scheme. This lower rate of return implies a lower (expected) lifetime income. Furthermore,
utility is lower under uncertainty compared to certainty. Note also that expected lifetime income
under a funded DB scheme and under both PAYG schemes is higher than the certain lifetime
income under the same pension schemes. For the funded DC scheme expected lifetime income is
11 This does not mean that it is always preferable to introduce a funded scheme or switch from a PAYG scheme to a
funded scheme. There is long list of literature comparing PAYG and funded schemes (e.g. Lindbeck and Persson (2003),
Sinn (2000) or Barr (2000)).
28equal to the certain lifetime income.12
Table 6.2 Certainty equivalents (CE)
Total CE Economic CE Demographic CE
(% y) (% y) (% y)
Full uncertainty
DB, Funded 0.71 0.68 0.02
DC, Funded 10.79 10.41 0.72
DB, PAYG 0.84 0.84 − 0.01











Table 6.2, under the label ‘Full uncertainty’, gives the certainty equivalents for total
uncertainty (economic and demographic uncertainty) and for economic and demographic
uncertainty separately. The latter two show how much people want to pay to avoid economic
(demographic) uncertainty and keep demographic (economic) uncertainty. From this table we
can make the following observations. First, the funded DB scheme is very close to full certainty.
People want to pay only a very small amount of money, less than 1% of income, to avoid
uncertainty. This conﬁrms the observation in table 6.1 where we saw that utility of a funded DB
scheme under uncertainty was almost identical to utility of a funded DB scheme under certainty.
Second, both DB schemes, whether PAYG ﬁnanced or funded, show low certainty
equivalents. The DC schemes are regarded more risky as people are willing to pay a larger
amount of money to keep off the uncertainty. However, one may not conclude that the PAYG DB
scheme is preferred to the funded DC scheme because the certainty equivalent is higher for the
latter. What matters is expected lifetime utility which is higher for a funded DC scheme than for
a PAYG DB scheme (see table 6.1).
Finally, comparing the second and third column of the full uncertainty panel, reveals that
economic uncertainty is much more important than demographic uncertainty. For all pension
12 See appendix C for a formal proof.
29schemes the economic certainty equivalents are higher than the demographic counterparts,
indicating that consumers are willing to give up more income to avoid economic risks than to
avoid demographic risks.
6.2 Demographic or economic uncertainty only
This section considers the situation where consumers only face either economic uncertainty or
demographic uncertainty. The bottom half of table 6.1 shows the results for these cases.
Table 6.2 gives the corresponding certainty equivalents. These ﬁgures conﬁrm the ﬁnding of the
previous section, that economic uncertainty is much more important for consumers than
demographic uncertainty.
Using table 6.2 we can decompose the total certainty equivalent into the economic certainty
equivalent and the demographic certainty equivalent. To illustrate, combining the ﬁrst two
columns under ‘Full uncertainty’ with the column under ‘Demographic uncertainty’ gives a
decomposition where, ﬁrst, economic uncertainty is separated and then the remaining
demographic uncertainty is valued. It follows for example that for the funded DC scheme the
total certainty equivalent of 10.8% of income can be split up in a economic certainty equivalent
of 10.4% and a demographic certainty equivalent of 0.4%. Doing it the other way around by ﬁrst
separating the demographic uncertainty, the values for economic and demographic uncertainty
become respectively 10.1% and 0.7%.
Demographic uncertainty only plays a signiﬁcant role in the PAYG DC scheme where the
total certainty equivalent of 1.2% can be divided into almost 0.8% for economic uncertainty and
0.5% for demographic uncertainty. So in this case approximately one third of the value of the
uncertainty is explained by demographic uncertainty. For the other three schemes this is less
than 10%.
6.3 Sensitivity analysis
To investigate the robustness of our results, we perform a sensitivity analysis for alternative
parameter values. Table 6.3 gives an overview of the parameters analysed and the results for the
certainty equivalents. We observe from this table that the conclusion that economic uncertainty
matters more than demographic uncertainty is robust.
If θ is higher (lower) one would expect that the certainty equivalent will be higher (lower) as
well since this corresponds to more (less) risk aversion. This holds for the funded DC scheme
and for both PAYG schemes. However, it does not hold for the funded DB scheme. There, both a
higher and a lower θ imply a higher certainty equivalent compared to the benchmark case. This
30Table 6.3 Sensitivity analysis for certainty equivalents
Baseline θ ρ α β yt
2 6 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.7 0.05 0.95 0.5yt 1.5yt
Full uncertainty
DB, Funded 0.71 0.92 0.86 0.77 0.66 2.46 1.10 0.83 1.29 0.71 0.71
DC, Funded 10.79 7.20 14.01 11.05 10.57 10.79 10.79 3.34 24.54 10.79 10.79
DB, PAYG 0.84 0.42 1.56 0.79 0.91 1.80 6.85 1.53 0.58 0.84 0.84
DC, PAYG 1.29 0.74 2.08 1.26 1.33 2.29 6.70 2.09 0.99 1.29 1.29
Economic uncertainty
DB, Funded 0.68 0.87 0.85 0.75 0.64 2.34 1.10 0.83 1.26 0.68 0.68
DC, Funded 10.41 6.95 13.52 10.66 10.19 10.41 10.41 2.81 24.28 10.41 10.41
DB, PAYG 0.84 0.40 1.55 0.78 0.90 1.64 6.68 1.46 0.57 0.84 0.84
DC, PAYG 0.79 0.43 1.38 0.75 0.84 1.83 6.09 1.44 0.57 0.79 0.79
Demographic uncertainty
DB, Funded 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.16 − 0.01 − 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.02
DC, Funded 0.72 0.48 0.66 0.73 0.70 0.72 0.72 0.76 − 2.13 0.72 0.72
DB, PAYG − 0.01 − 0.00 − 0.01 − 0.01 − 0.01 0.10 0.25 − 0.01 − 0.01 − 0.01 − 0.01
DC, PAYG 0.44 0.33 0.52 0.46 0.42 0.58 0.09 0.57 0.40 0.44 0.44
could be explained by noting that in our CRRA utility function a higher θ implies higher risk
aversion as well as a lower intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Hence, a higher θ implies,
ﬁrst, that the consumer becomes more risk averse and will be prepared to pay a higher certainty
equivalent for the same amount of risk. At the same time, a lower intertemporal elasticity of
substitution implies that the consumer is less willing to substitute consumption between periods
and thus implies lower private savings. But lower private savings imply less risk and, thus, a
lower certainty equivalent. These two opposing effects on the certainty equivalent apparently
lead to a non-monotonic relationship between θ and the certainty equivalents.
In case of funded schemes, a higher subjective discount rate ρ implies lower certainty
equivalents. For PAYG schemes the opposite holds. If ρ is higher less weight will be attached to
the future and, thus, to future uncertainty. Hence, one would expect certainty equivalents to drop
as is indeed the case with funded pension schemes. The opposite results for the PAYG pension
schemes needs further investigation.
A higher or lower replacement rate α for the pension fund has no effect in a funded DC
scheme which is obvious since funded DC savings and private savings are perfect substitutes in
our model. For the other schemes certainty equivalents are higher. In a funded DB scheme the
pension savings of consumers are protected against the risks in the rate of return on these
savings. If the replacement rate is lower, consumers have relatively more private savings on
which they run rate of return risks. This explains a higher certainty equivalent in this case. In
case the replacement rate is lower for PAYG pension schemes, a similar effect is at work.
31More risky assets in the portfolio of consumers and pension funds (a higher β) obviously
leads to higher certainty equivalents for the funded DC scheme. When there are PAYG ﬁnanced
pension schemes and there is a switch to more equity, the certainty equivalents drop. In case of a
funded DB scheme or PAYG schemes, an increase in equity has two opposing effects on the
certainty equivalent. First, a switch to more equity provides a hedge against productivity growth
risks. Table 5.1 shows that the correlation between productivity growth and equity returns is
negative. Thus, for the DB schemes, low pension beneﬁts due to low productivity growth is
(partly) compensated by higher returns on private savings. The same holds for the PAYG DC
scheme since the ‘return’ on the PAYG contribution is linked to productivity growth as well.
Second, the risk on private savings increases with an increase of equity in the portfolio. This
second effect, however, does not undo the hedge effect in PAYG schemes because in these
schemes private savings are low. This does not hold in case of funded DB pensions.
The simulations reveal a non-monotonic relation between the share of equity in the portfolio
and the value of the certainty equivalent in the funded DB scheme. Very low shares of equity as
well as very high shares of equity give higher values for the certainty equivalents than the
baseline case where the portfolio contains 50% equity and 50% bonds. Apparently, when equity
is increased if the share of equity is still low, the hedge effect dominates the increased risk on
private savings (which are low in case of a low equity share) and the certainty equivalent
declines. If the share of equity is increased further, private savings grow and the increased risk
on these private savings starts to dominate the hedge effect of the pension beneﬁt. As a result,
the certainty equivalent increases.
Finally, the initial income has no effect on the certainty equivalents. It only affects (expected)
lifetime utility because lifetime income is higher or lower (not shown here).
6.4 The impact of uncertainty on consumer behaviour
In reality consumers are confronted with a lot of uncertainties. Undoubtedly, these uncertainties
have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on economic behaviour. Yet, most research into the sustainability of
welfare states has been done in the context of certainty, or rather, in a world in which consumers
do not respond to the uncertainties they face. A natural question is what do we miss, in terms of
welfare costs, if we assume that consumers are not aware of uncertainty.
We compare two different informational assumptions of an optimising consumer with respect
to the economic and demogaphic random variables. The benchmark case is the rational
expectations assumption that is already used throughout this chapter. In this case, consumers are
well-informed in that they know the complete distribution of the random variables. As a
consequence, the consumer actually recognizes that he is confronted with uncertainty and takes
32this uncertainty explicitly into account when he decides upon his amount of savings
(precautionary savings motive).
We compare the benchmark with the case where consumers only know a point forecast. We
impose that this point forecast is equal to the sample mean. Since consumers behave as if there is
no uncertainty, the optimising consumption rules for the benchmark are sub-optimal. Instead, the
consumer applies the rules derived in section 4.1 under certainty. Hence, the consumer does not
have any precautionary savings motive in this case.
How to measure the welfare gain of a consumer that has rational expectations versus a naive
consumer that only has a point forecast? As in section 5.2 we will use the concept of
compensating variation. That is, we compute the minimal amount of income that must be given
to the less-informed consumer (point forecast assumption) to give him the same utility level he
would get in the benchmark situation (rational expectations assumption). See appendix B.3 for
the technical details.
Table 6.4 Compensating variations (% income)
Baseline (θ = 4) θ = 2 θ = 6
DB, Funded 0.00 0.02 0.06
DC, Funded 6.71 0.43 24.79
DB, PAYG 0.36 0.00 14.59
DC, PAYG 0.47 0.00 7.00
Table 6.4 displays the compensating variations as percentage of wage income for each
pension scheme and for different degrees of risk aversion. In general, the compensating
variations increase with the degree of risk aversion. This makes intuitively sense, because a more
risk averse consumer will engage in more precautionary savings if he takes uncertainty explicitly
into account. As a consequence, the sub-optimality of the point-forecast decision rule, increases
and hence, a consumer is more willing to pay for additional information.13
In case of a funded DB scheme the compensating variations are very low, indicating that in
this scheme a consumers willingness to pay for additional information regarding the distribution
of the random variables (rational expectations) is rather minimal. This result is robust for the
degree of risk aversion.
In case of PAYG schemes the compensating variation is also rather small for the baseline. In
a DB scheme, for example, consumers are willing to pay at most 0.36% for additional
information. For a DC scheme this percentage is somewhat higher but still small, 0.47%.
13 Note that the funded DB results are not completely monotone in θ. In the sensitivity analysis of section 6.3 we
observed the same discontinuity for the funded DB scheme. There we explained that this probably has to deal with the
fact that for CRRA utility θ not only determines risk aversion but also intertemporal substitution in consumption.
33Interestingly, for θ = 6, the compensating variation is much higher for a DB than for a DC
scheme. This contra-intuitive result needs further investigation.
The sub-optimality of point-forecasting is most severe for a funded DC scheme. Note that
consumers are willing to pay at most 6.7% of their income for more information. This result is
not surprising, because the amount of uncertainty consumers face is the largest in this scheme.
Note further that the compensating variation heavily depends on the degree of risk aversion. For
θ = 2 the compensating variation declines to 0.43%, while for θ = 6 it increases to 25%.
Overall, our analysis indicates that in most cases the welfare costs of neglecting uncertainty
are small.14 However, this result depends on the type of pension scheme and the degree of risk
aversion. For a funded DC scheme, for example, the welfare costs of the point-forecast decision
rule can be really large.
14 Although their analysis only considers mortality risk, Alho and Määttänen (2006) come to the same preliminary
conclusion.
347 Concluding remarks
Two questions were at the centre of this paper. First, what type uncertainty is more important:
economic or demographic? Second, what are the consequences for consumer behaviour of
including uncertainty? We analysed these questions in the context of a two-period overlapping
generations model. The overall conclusion of the assessment of the importance of economic
uncertainty vis-à-vis demographic uncertainty is that for a consumer facing both types of
uncertainty, it is economic uncertainty that matters the most. As to the second question, the
consequences for behaviour of including uncertainty, the results suggest that the average welfare
costs of not taking uncertainty into account are fairly low.
The sensitivity analysis revealed several non-monotonic relations between exogenous
parameters and the certainty equivalents that warrant a further investigation. One obvious
extension therefore is to replace the standard CRRA utility function with a utility function where
the risk aversion and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution can be separated. Not only can
we analyse in more detail the double role of θ in the current model, we can also take account of
the equity premium puzzle that we passed over in this paper by our choice for θ.
Another extension is to endogenize portfolio selection. In the present version, consumers and
pension funds have a ﬁxed portfolio of nominal bonds and equity. Endogenizing portfolio choice
for consumers is an obvious and straightforward extension because it gives consumers an extra
instrument to diversify risk. Since the risks imposed on consumers by the mandatory pension
funds differ between the four pension schemes, consumers may adapt the choice between stocks
and bonds for their private portfolio accordingly. Doing this for pension funds is less
straightforward because it requires the formulation of an objective function for these funds.
Including only the utility of present generations may lead to excessive investment in equity in
funded DB schemes since the risks on these investments are (partly) transferred to future,
unrepresented generations.
35Appendix A Welfare analysis
Technically, the compensating variation can be derived from the value function which expresses
maximal attainable utility as function of total wealth (ﬁnancial wealth plus human wealth). For
this purpose, the utility-maximisation problem of equation (3.5) can be written in a more general

































where Ht is an arbitrary constant and Kt is human wealth. The constant φ is a shift parameter
that ensures that the value function exactly gives the same outcome as equation (A.1).16
Substituting the value function in the Bellman equation and solving the resulting maximisation












Denoting the original utility level by superscript ’o’ and the new utility level by superscript ’n’,








































































15 For HARA class utility (as CRRA utility), the value function has the same form as the utility function (Merton (1990)).
16 It is easy to show that φ = 1 for retired consumers in the two-period OLG model.
36Equations (A.4) and (A.5) can be worked out for our two-period OLG model. Since
w1t ≡ (1−πt)yt and w2t ≡ bt and it is assumed that there are no deaths in the ﬁrst period of life
(ε1t = 1), we have:












































































37Appendix B The computations of the certainty equivalents
From the stochastic simulations we know the maximal expected utility:















What we want to know is how much income yt (or, equivalently, lifetime income yLF
t ) people are
willing to forgo to avoid the economic and/or demographic uncertainty. That is, what certain















We are interested in three certainty equivalents:
• avoiding all uncertainty;
• avoiding only economic uncertainty;
• avoiding only demographic uncertainty.
B.1 Avoiding all uncertainty
For a given certain level of income e yt, consumption in both periods equals:













Note that, in case of certainty, for all pension schemes we have bt+1/yt = (1+gt+1)α. Inserting



























Since uncertainty has a different impact in each of the four pension schemes, we have to
compute the certainty equivalent income for each of the pension schemes.
38B.2 Avoiding economic or demographic uncertainty
To compute the certainty equivalent for economic or demographic uncertainty only is more
involved because it implies comparing full uncertainty with partial uncertainty and, in general,
we cannot derive explicit solution for either situation. The question we want answer is
comparable to the question in the previous section of this appendix: what income level ˆ yt (under
only economic or demographic uncertainty and with matching consumption levels ˆ c1t and ˆ c2t+1)


































ˆ Fi ˆ yt − ˆ c1t
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(B.9)








By inserting the last equation for ˆ c2t+1 in the other two, we end up with the following system of
two non-linear equations in ˆ c1t and ˆ yt:
















−U = 0 (B.10)







































































39B.3 Welfare cost of neglecting uncertainty
Let the optimising consumer only have a point forecast (PFC) regarding the random variables.
Solving the maximisation problem of equation (3.5) then gives for ﬁrst period consumption:









with Ft deﬁned in equation (B.4). Substituting equation (B.14) in the intertemporal budget





Nt = Ft −Mt (B.17)
Note that c1t is deterministic, while c2t+1 is random. In addition, since Ft depends on the type of
pension scheme, the same holds for Mt and Nt.
Now we ask the question what income level, say ˘ yt (with corresponding consumption levels
˘ c1t and ˘ c2t+1), gives a consumer that is endowed with only a point forecast the same utility as he













































Finally, the compensating variation (CV) is the compensating payment that leaves the
less-informed consumer as well off as a well-informed consumer. Thus,
CVt = ˘ yt −yt (B.21)
40Appendix C Lifetime income under certainty and
uncertainty










When there is no uncertainty the random variables always equal their expected values and the



























By inserting the appropriate equation for bt+1 it follows that for the funded DC scheme expected
lifetime income equals certain lifetime income. For the two DB pension schemes the following
































Using that E[A/B] = E[A]·E[1/B]+cov(A,1/B) and applying Jensen’s inequality that
















Hence, if cov(1+gt+1, 1
1+rt+1) > 0 expected lifetime income under uncertainty is higher than
lifetime income under certainty.
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